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I. THE VITAL ROLE OF THE SECTOR AND THE CHALLENGE 
 
Today, the independent, non-profit sector, founded, created and praised, as the 
complement or supplement to the dominant major public and private sectors of our democracy 
and economy, has become a major player, if not the major one, in many aspects of our social, 
corporate and public life. The reality in fact is that we need and depend on this sector far more 
than ever before. the Third Sector is now central to, and virtually the dominant player in, the 
charitable and the social justice safety net, not merely the supplement to it, because of the 
decline in the role of government, the increase in the role of the private sector, and the dramatic 
expansion of the reach/role and functions of the non-profit world in the USA. NFP  entities  now 
increasingly play and fulfill the functions of both the private and public sectors   in, for example, 
health care, education and human services, international economic, public health, and 
civic stabilization, credit financing and legal services, in addition to the arts, sciences, research, 
and entrepreneurial and innovative risk taking pilot and other projects. 
The NFP sector touches all of our lives, and is vital to our quality of life. This happened, in large 
measure, because of tax laws that permit a huge shielding of wealth, creation of private 
foundations, and the influential impact of corporate social responsibility. With great opportunity 
and great power also comes great responsibility – in the words of Spiderman, to whom much is 
given, much is expected. The intersection of power and money without independent checks and 
balances yields corruption. It is precisely because the sector plays such a major role in American 
society and is the recipient of hundreds of billions of dollars in public, charitable and tax exempt 
funds that overarching and effective oversight of nonprofits is sorely needed. 
Therefore, I challenge all of us in this sector (institutions, boards, executives, and regulators) to 
justify, as a matter of public policy, why this sector should be immune from public 
accountability and responsibility. 
   
II. THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS IN THE SECTOR 
                                                          
 Senior Counsel, Proskauer Rose LLP; Fmr. Massachusetts Attorney General 
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The examples can be ripped from the headlines – Penn State’s Integrity; Politics and the 
Race for the Cure; Non-profits/community groups as created to feather the nest of NY State 
elected officials; Major Halfway House Provider to two states as major contributors to 
Governor's campaigns; the executive compensation of the CEO of the once a year Fiesta Bow l; 
C3 and C4 Super-PACS; the disintegration of ACORN; plus the Smithsonian, United Way, and 
Red Cross.  These are just a few examples of the reputational impact of allegedly major scandals 
involving flawed Non-Profit Board and Executive governance and potential abuse of state and 
federal charitable status, not by small, grass roots organizations, trade solicitors, or fraudulent 
scams. These involve nationally known, well-financed, public, private, charitable non-profits 
who have or could have had sophisticated boards, expert legal counsel, and are major employers 
and recipients of significant public and donor dollars. These flagrant , recent  and recurring 
examples occurred in spite of the sector’s commitment, repeatedly expressed to Congress,  that 
the sector has effective self-regulatory best practice standards ; in spite of the existence of a 
plethora of non-profit governance experts in every sector and state ;  and  in spite of the external 
enforcement and regulatory existence and oversight of Attorneys General, the Internal Revenue 
Service and Department of Justice, not to mention boards presumably dedicated to the highest 
standards of fiduciary duty! 
Unfortunately, these flawed governance examples cannot merely be dismissed as 
exceptions or outliers – they represent the persistent and consistent reality that failed and flawed 
governance, oversight and regulation are far too frequent in the so-called Independent Sector. 
In spite of the sector’s critical impact, status, and role in our democracy, f or a variety of 
reasons, absent whistleblowers, media focus, partisan ideological conflicts, or elected or 
appointed political crusaders; this sector operates with immunity and impunity, even though it is 
the beneficiary of, and actively lobbies for, the highly favorable federal, state and local legal 
framework which supports its existence. Proposals to alter this state of affairs (let alone “mess 
with the charitable deduction”) face uniform and unified resistance from the sector, and 
regulators too often seem disinclined to alter this state, thanks to the Sector's political and civic 
influence, its noble mission and rhetoric, major lobbying and media power, and limited, over-
stretched resources, barriers to multi-faceted coordination, and the absence of any meaningful 
citizen or constituency public interest advocacy groups.  This role expansion, while offering 
immense potential, also comes with a price: First, the sector is also in the public, media, and 
ideological eye –and increasingly held to standards similar to corporate and public America. 
Second, because of the sources of financial support, and the immense sums needed to sustain the 
NFP place and role, the sector is often perceived to be beholden to those financial interests, 
donors, and their attitudes and perspectives – almost more than to its mission or constituents!  
It is long-overdue to ask– who then are the guardians of the public and charitable interest? And, 
more importantly, who, on behalf of the public interest, will lead the charge for the application of 
the core principles of civic capitalism to the NFP sector, as well as the public and private 
sectors?  
 
III. CIVIC CAPITALISM AND THE NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR 
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Many of us believe that  effective external oversight is precisely what is needed if the 
nonprofit sector is to be held accountable for ensuring that the public interest  in charitable 
giving and purposes is protected ,  and the  public  interests  (not merely the sector's 
interests)  are  served,  heard and valued  by the Sector . Therefore, I propose that as a condition 
for preservation of the charitable deduction and the sector’s independence, the concept of civic 
capitalism be used as a template for such an oversight regime, enforcement and sanctions – 
whether internal and/or external. The concept of civic capitalism is as relevant today to the not 
for profit sector, as to the corporate and public sectors. The failures we see in governance are 
failures of   the core principles and checks and balances of democracy. Is our common good and 
cause our self-interest or the public interest? The concept of civic capitalism is that independence 
and markets are important and should generally operate freely – but only within a strong 
democratic framework which fosters civil society, encourages public participation, ensures 
accountability and regulates systemic risk. 
The economic crises of the past decade unfolded because of a failure of individual and 
institutional accountability, a decade of lessons not learned! The obvious solution was to enact 
strong, but limited regulation and erect ethical barriers between the sector and regulators. The 
importance of an ethical corporate culture is clear but, standing alone, without a “cop on the 
beat,” allowed ethical breakdowns which harmed system integrity. Similarly in the NFP sector, 
the leaders still oppose measures to effect meaningful reforms, including more external oversight 
and accountability.  But there is no public outrage or demand to be heard because the other 
missing link s   are  a strong institutional voice and vehicle for protection of the public interest 
(e.g. Attorneys-General or DOJ) and  citizen  advocacy and  participation. The remedy then is to 
continue to encourage and support a robust sector, engage citizens and the voices of the public, 
and ensures a system of governance that actively promotes board and executive accountability 
and the public’s ability to provide a check.  
There is merit to the argument that external regulation, or self-regulation with teeth, may 
have unintended consequences that might ultimately outweigh the benefits to be gained, or the 
benefits may be so limited that it is not worth pursuing. Yet, given the litany of abuses in the 
nonprofit  sector  and , more important,  its failure to heal itself, far stronger evidence is required 
before it can be credibly argued that, on the merits of being the non-profit sector alone, it should 
be left to its own devices.   The sector’s institutional interests are not aligned in favor of civic 
capitalism – i.e. robust autonomy within a strong, but limited, regulatory framework where there 
is a real referee, a level playing field, the certainty of penalties for violations, and a belief that 
accountability, disclosure, independence and honest, fair governance and oversight has intrinsic 
systemic value.  
Ironically, this "Civic Capitalism" is what we in the independent sector consistently 
demand – and more – from both the public and private sector that we 
theoretically supplement, monitor and balance! Therefore, the champions of the public interest in 
the Sector's constituents (including the poor, powerless and vulnerable who today, more than 
ever, depend upon the Sector for social and economic justice and the adherence to Democratic 
values) face great challenges and even greater political resistance and power from the sector in 
arguing that similar standards should apply, in return for the sector’s “favored” status.   This 
favored status is a result of tax laws that permit a huge amount of shielding of wealth, creation of 
private foundations, and the influential impact of corporate social responsibility, individual and 
corporate philanthropy. 
4 
The core question is whether this is still the “Independent Sector” Gardner envisioned, 
and, if so, on whose behalf?  For example, on whose behalf does the sector – in all its diversity – 
unite to advocate for and preserve the charitable deduction, but cannot unite to aggressively 
lobby and advocate to preserve the social safety net, reduce gun violence, hold "Too big to fail" 
financial institutions accountable, reform the tax code to eliminate corporate and special interest 
tax breaks, or reduce the yawning and anti-democracy income inequality gap?  
 
IV. MY "FELLOW TRAVELER" CREDENTIALS FOR MAKING THIS CHALLENGE  
 
I make this challenge and propose these remedies, as a "fellow traveler” – the chair and 
vice-chair of two non-profit boards – one a major service deliverer; one an ethics excellence 
center; a member of not-for-profit boards for 40 years – from grassroots community councils, to 
public interest, legal and human services advocates and providers. I was the beneficiary of 
political and partnership support from a Massachusetts NFP community that pioneered de-
institutionalization of care and treatment through the third sector organizations that remain today 
as major professional leaders. And I served as CEO of Common Cause, a major national NFP 
advocacy group that survived and was transformed, thanks to Foundation funding and major 
donor contributions. 
In addition, as the Attorney General of Massachusetts and thereby the charities regulator, 
I oversaw this sector in all its diversity – some 33,000 of you – and learned from wise advisors 
and skilled practitioners. I appreciate the range and diversity, skill and expertise, and deep 
commitments and caring reflected by its leaders, boards and volunteers. And now, a major part 
of my regulatory and governance practice – and speaking and writing – is about non-profit 
governance, investigations, compliance and best practices, plus crisis management and, 
hopefully, prevention through early intervention. And I was a member of the Independent Sector 
Self-Regulatory Advisory group which published “Principles for Good Governance and Ethical 
Practices” in October, 2007. 
I know and understand the legitimate concerns about potentially over-bearing, costly, 
bureaucratic “regulation”, having seen this now from all sides. However, these same concerns 
are regularly raised by the private sector as well, in spite of all evidence that they have no 
capacity for self regulation. Surely it is in no one’s interests – or consistent with our values – to 
have a major sector of our society freed from public accountability. As John Gardner noted, 
“Liberty, Duty; Freedom, Responsibility – that’s the deal!” Surely, absent a dramatically 
changed culture and investment in effective internal and self-regulation by Boards, and/or the 
sector peers, NFPs cannot be immune from democratic accountability. 
Gardner assumed that NFP organizations of any type, and their boards and leaders, would 
be independent of self interest, accountable, and bound by fiduciary duties, and, therefore, free to 
encourage the organizations to be engaged, to be in the fray, to be the voice for those who might 
otherwise not be heard in society, in the halls of government or the corporate board suites, and to 
be their watchdogs. That was the legal basis for their freedom from government regulation and 
the demands of shareholder profit. And, above all, free to educate and remind citizens and 
government and institutions that for a government of, by and for the people, "Democracy was not 
a spectator sport"! 
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V. THE SECTOR'S MOTIVES FOR RESISTANCE TO CIVIC CAPITALISM (PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY) ARE SUSPECT. 
 
There are so many lessons to be learned, and so much solid, good learning, experience 
and expertise within the Sector, about how NFPs can successfully and proactively apply and 
adapt principles of governance, accountability, independence, disclosure, compliance, oversight, 
fiduciary duties, codes of ethics, and standards of excellence. Therefore, the failure of the sector 
to champion and implement them, at least through effective forms of self-regulation, to seal off 
the argument for external review, raises the red flags all by itself. Ironically, these are the same 
kind of “flags” that many leaders in the sector use to criticize government or corporate leaders 
when they seek to protect secrecy, avoid disclosure, and fend off watchdogs! 
Internally, just one example makes the point. Besides the extensive and effective work 
generally of Independent Sector's Non-Profit Panel, the attempt to devise a uniform, standardized 
list of “best practices” to guide nonprofit organizations, by the 2007 Panel on the Nonprofit 
Sector, and its Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice is exemplary.  The report 
presents “33 Principles of Sound Practice,” covering Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure, 
Effective Governance, Strong Financial Oversight and Responsible Fundraising. These 
guidelines, directed to nonprofit organizations of every size and scope, are truly exceptional; 
they represent the best of the best practices, and the best possible check list for any nonprofit 
organization in terms of measuring its practices and standard. 
Strides have also been made to create new, and improve upon existing, governance 
mechanisms designed to monitor the nonprofit industry, i.e. the IRS and its tax code and some 
state attorneys general, and provide limited legal, regulatory, and enforcement oversight of the 
nonprofit sector.  The pressures of media coverage and donor demands further help to influence 
the direction of the industry.  
Yet, Even when the record is clear that 1-2 % of the NFP organizations account for 80-
90 % of the  “charitable” revenue, the leading sector organizations (including trade) resist 
external oversight á la Sarbanes - Oxley, even in modified form, in spite of sector best practices 
which demonstrate effective ways to achieve excellence in governance without making it one 
size fits all. The sector leadership continues to defend the lowest common denominator; fails to 
distinguish large from small organizations, services from charity and safety net from 
philanthropy; and generally adheres to the code of silence in face of high profile cases of abuse – 
except when Congress, state and federal regulators threaten to exercise oversight in the face of 
patterns of abuse, or challenge the favored tax status. Just like corporate America, the sector far 
too often “rags the puck” to run out the clock, outlast external critics, and lobby aggressively to 
prevent regulation.  
 
 
VI. THE REMEDY: MULTI-FACETED COLLABORATION -MANDATED! 
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Unless the status quo is acceptable and appropriate, and all of the forgoing discussion is 
deemed, "the exception proves the rule', the following actions are obvious and essential first 
steps in remedying the serious governance flaws that mar the sector's credibility and integrity, 
and which may trigger a true renewal of civic capitalism, thereby validating its 'favored' status, 
as a matter of good public policy. 
First, the leaders of the nonprofit sector must elevate the “best practices” standards and 
principles from merely an aspirational resource which are valuable educational and technical 
assistance models for all, regardless of size, scope and function, to mandated, peer enforced 
minimums. They must become mandated ethical codes of governance conduct. 
Second, the education and technical assistance needed to elevate Best Practices to an 
ethically mandatory level must be funded, preferably by foundation grants or fees initially. 
Without access to educational and technical assistance, self-regulation, aspirational tomes and/or 
external regulation will continue to be largely hollow, rhetorical, and optional. The real danger 
and risk of unfunded mandates is that it undermines effective enforcement and regulation.  
Third, the initial level of routine enforcement and regulation should come from each of 
the major sector organizations and associations, which, as a condition of its existence or capacity 
to be an SRO, should have its own independent regulatory system, in addition to its membership, 
educational and best practice dissemination functions, geared to effective and efficient 
enforcement mechanisms for sanctioning those who violate its governance principles and best 
practices. Similarly, major grant making organizations should condition grants to any 
organization on compliance with governance principles, appropriate to their size, shape and 
function, and to any association which does not have an independent regulatory system. 
Fourth, to insure meaningful best practices, education and SROs, and an adequate 
protection of the public interest, there must be a credible enforcement capacity for existing state 
and federal laws. Everyone concedes that the current level of state and federal funding is 
inadequate – if credible and consistent enforcement and regulation are required. The best models 
are joint federal/state task forces, or federally-funded state programs (like the Medicaid Fraud 
program), or federal grant-making programs (like COPS) that ensure cooperation and 
coordination in enforcement, but also uniformity and consistency in terms of the sectors to be 
regulated. Hence, a joint Department of Justice, IRS and state attorney general and/or state 
charitable regulator association should be established, with a sector advisory panel to meet these 
objectives.   
At a minimum, the efforts of state AGs, through NASCO, the Columbia AG Charity 
Project to develop responsible, knowledgeable expertise, coordinated proactive guidelines for 
enforcement, build relationships with the Sector, and develop meaningful dialogue, while having 
the capacity to act in and for the public interest in a regulatory and enforcement role at the local 
level, must be encouraged and supported by the sector leaders. This would be a crucial signal of 
good faith, a legitimate desire to understand and influence the enforcement and regulatory 
priorities at the state and multi-state level. However, the enhancement of the AG role, and its 
maturity and consistency, cannot succeed unless these state-based public charity and public 
interest stewards and protectors have adequate resources.  The simple solution is to support AGs 
charitable units being funded by a percentage of the annual state charitable filing fees, to provide 
AGs with adequate technology, staff, and audit and accountability capacity. 
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Fifth, the sector itself should have an independent inspector-general. The creation of the 
I-G is essential if the state and federal enforcers/regulators lack funding, and/or the SROs lack 
teeth. It is a useful complement, à la Owens FINRA-like proposal, if there is also a viable SRO 
and state/federal enforcement capacity – not duplication. If inspector-generals are useful, even if 
unpopular, in governmental agencies, correctional departments or private corporations, surely 
they are appropriate for all nonprofit sectors and activities. The details of such a proposal lay 
more in the question of size, scope and function and who pays and what the costs are, rather than 
the necessity and/or possibility of it succeeding.   The inspector-generals can be funded by the 
major private associations in the first instance as part of the education, technical assistance and 
compliance budgets. As is the case with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this kind of 
compliance mechanism being in place would be viewed as a mitigating or safe harbor factor 
when faced with external regulators, prosecutors, or self-regulatory sanctioning. 
Sixth, and maybe the most important missing remedial ingredient is the absence of 
strong, public advocacy, participation and engagement, whether by public agencies like the AGs, 
constituents, donors, independent watchdogs or experts, to ensure accountability. This is a classic 
element of any method of democratic accountability. This could be achieved several ways: by 
requiring more public accountability and fiduciary expertise of Boards ; or  a cross-section of 
sector advisory groups for regulators; or common cause-like consumer protection “watchdogs”, à 
la PIRG, AARP. Drawing on the experience and success of the consumer and environmental 
protection and citizen advocacy movements, these groups would provide, at least in theory and 
potential, checks both on the regulators, and the sector guardians of fiduciary duties. 
At bottom, this multi-faceted collaborative solution and remedy exposes the fundamental 
flaws and weaknesses of the current legal, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, coupled 
with the internally-implemented best practice principles in their existing non-binding state. It 
demonstrates that the latter are insufficient, and likely deliberately so, to ensure a renewal of 
civic capitalism in the nonprofit sector. Therefore, a multi-level, multi-faceted strategy is crucial: 
External enforcement for crimes, fraud and fiduciary abuses at all levels; strengthened 
accreditation and association models, and the sanctioning requirements of grant makers; a 
presumptive Sarbanes-Oxley-type approach for institutions and foundations of major size and 
revenue; adapting core principles and methods of self-regulation with teeth at all other levels; 
and introducing coordinated joint federal-state oversight, plus the independent inspector-general 
concept of self-regulation, with citizen advocacy and participation. 
This strategy is based on the belief that prevention is the best and cheapest form of 
protection, and that a credible, industry-specific enforcement regime can establish a framework 
and a minimum ethic as a boundary and floor, within which innovation, autonomy and pluralism 
can thrive. Such a structure would encourage the nonprofit sector to affirm its strength and 
mission, its belief in accountability and integrity, and its potential for doing well by doing good. 
It affords the industry the ability to invite and thrive on scrutiny and accountability, and to be the 
first to spot and solve the problems, as well as to identify and implement the remedy. By taking 
the lead on its own enforcement and “watchdog” regime, the sector will enhance its reputation 
and standing, as well as its operational efficiency and effectiveness and preserve its core values 
and strengths --independence, pluralism, and innovation – all to the glory and mission of 
strengthening our eroding civil society, common ground, common causes, and community – and 
our Democracy, making De Tocqueville and Gardner proud. 
 
